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PATENT POOLS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY SHARING 
Erik Hovenkamp* 
Herbert Hovenkamp** 
 
Introduction 
 A patent "pool" is an arrangement under which patent holders in a common technology or 
market commit their patents to a single holder, who then licenses them out to the original 
patentees and perhaps to outsiders.  Structures vary, however, and may involve simple cross 
licensing rather than a separate holder (Hovenkamp, et al., 2015; Mattioli 2014; Lerner, Strojwas 
& Tirole, 2007).  Licensors in a pool can include both practicing and non-practicing entities.  
Licensees are of course practicing entities.  The copyright blanket license, which has provoked 
some antitrust litigation,1 is not really a pool because the artist members do little licensing to one 
another.  Rather, artists and other copyright holders grant a nonexclusive license to a central 
clearinghouse, which then gives a blanket license to the entire portfolio to outside licensees such 
as radio stations.  In addition are several open source licensing arrangements, which largely 
involve agreements to share royalty-free access to copyrighted works.2 
 The payoffs to pooling include both revenue earned as a licensor, and technology 
acquired by the pool member as licensee.  Public effects can also be significant.  For example, 
technology sharing of complementary patents can improve product quality and variety.  In some 
information technology markets pools can prevent patents from becoming a costly obstacle to 
innovation by clearing channels of technology transfer.  For "essential" patents, or patents 
incorporated into networks by a standard setting organization (SSO), a pool might enable 
competitive production by giving multiple firms access to the needed technology. (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2004).  Pools can also be used to fix product prices or reduce output, however.  Further, 
they can facilitate concerted refusals to deal, or boycotts directed against competing technologies 
outside the pool.3  In sum, the private and social benefits to pooling can be substantial, but some 
threats to competition cannot be ignored. 
 To illustrate, suppose that one toaster maker has invented a device that detects accurately 
when bread is toasted just enough.  Another maker has invented a device that senses how wide 
the bread is and moves the heating elements just the right distance away.  These devices are 
complements in most scenarios.  A toaster might have neither of them, either one, or both.  
Further, if customers value both, having both would make a toaster more valuable. 
                                                          
* Northwestern Univ. Department of Economics 
** Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa 
1 E.g., Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
2 One prominent example is the Android operating system.  See 
https://source.android.com/source/licenses.html. 
3 E.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963). 
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 The two toaster makers might do one or more of the following: 1) they might pool or 
"cross license," enabling both manufacturers to make toasters including both features.  2) They 
might additionally agree to issue licenses to other toaster makers, thus enabling third parties to 
make toasters with both features as well; in so doing, they might jointly agree on the price of a 
joint license; or they might agree to specify the price at which toasters produced under this joint 
license agreement are sold, or the number that can be made under the license.   3) They might 
make no agreement at all about licensing others, thus leaving each firm to decide whether to 
license out its particular feature.  Or 4) they might agree with each other that neither will license 
its feature to third parties.  While technology sharing between the two manufacturers is efficient, 
creating a more desirable product or lowering production costs, the various limitations on price 
or quantity or the limitations on third party production might all pose competitive threats.  
Further, there might be less restrictive alternatives that can achieve similar goals but without the 
competitive injury.  Most antitrust challenges to patent pools require analysis under the rule of 
reason, which requires proof of market power, or the absence of competitive alternatives, and 
anticompetitive effects (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2010, Ch. 15). 
 Historically, most pools involved situations where each patent was presumed to make a 
significant contribution to the final product.  More recently, particularly in information 
technologies, individual patents have grown much smaller in relation to product value.  Some 
products such as digital video or cell phones now arguably embody thousands of patents.  In 
addition, much of the current debate over poor patent quality is focused on these areas. 
Traditional Considerations-- Complements vs. Substitutes 
 A traditional justification for patent pools is that they facilitate improved products by 
uniting complements, which are two things that are more valuable when used together. 4  Sharing 
of complementary patents means that licensees can then employ all the patents in their product, 
rather than creating silos in which each manufacturer incorporates only its own patented features.  
In the toaster example, customers can buy toasters with both patented features.   By contrast, if 
the patents are substitutes -- i.e., if each one performs a version of the same thing -- then 
manufacturers will ordinarily use one of the alternatives but not more.  In that case cross-
licensing of the patents is more suspicious and may facilitate price fixing. (Gilbert, 2004; 
Santore, 2010). 
 The substitutes/complements distinction is helpful for understanding the basic benefits 
and costs of cross-licensing.  For example, it has been shown that patent pools increase welfare 
when included patents are perfect complements (i.e., they have no value unless they are used 
together), and decrease welfare when they are perfect substitutes (i.e., one is as good as the other 
but no one needs both) (Shapiro, 2001). 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931). 
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Avoiding Royalty Stacking and Holdup 
 "Stacking" occurs when multiple sellers of complementary or vertically related products 
each have some market power but are unable to coordinate their output.  The result is double 
marginalization. (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Lemley & Shapiro, 2007; Hovenkamp & 
Hovenkamp, 2015)  For example, if two patentees who each have market power should license 
individually, the sum of the two license fees will be greater than if they joined together and 
coordinated their price.  Under traditional assumptions, double marginalization not only results 
in lower output and higher prices for consumers, it also injures sellers who are unable to 
coordinate their output.  That is, the resulting price is higher than the monopoly profit-
maximizing price. Pooling addresses this problem by permitting licensor participants to 
coordinate their prices and output. 
 The holdup problem is related, and occurs when licensing of essential technology occurs 
sequentially.  For example, once a manufacturer has settled on technology A, its range of 
subsequent technology decisions narrows, and this may give the owners of a secondary 
technology power to charge more.  The problem resembles that of the highway builder planning 
a route.  Before any construction begins the land market is competitive.  As soon as the builder 
makes a commitment to a certain route and starts building, however, the range of remaining 
options narrows.  As a result the price can be expected to rise.  A more competitive solution 
would be for the builder to "package" parcels of land along alternative routes in advance and 
then let the landowners bid against each other to sell the entire package.  Patent pooling 
accomplishes the same thing by permitting packages of complementary technologies that make 
up a product to be sold simultaneously. 
"Blocking" patents 
 Two patents are said to be "blocking" when practice of one requires infringement (or a 
license) of the other. Blocking applies to individual patent claims, rather than the patent as a 
whole.  Unlicensed practice of only one claim constitutes infringement.  In a two-way block 
neither patent can be practiced without a license to the other.  In the more common one-way 
block, patent A cannot be practiced without a license to B, but B can be practiced without a 
license to A.5 So-called "improvement" patents are frequently one-way blocking patents. 
(Lemley, 1997)  That is, if B is an improvement patent on A, then the only way to make use of 
the B improvement would be to have a license to A as well.  However, the owner of original A 
can still practice it without a license to B.  The courts all agree that mandatory package licensing 
of blocking patents cannot be unlawful.6  It follows that two separate owners of blocking patents 
                                                          
5 For a decision relying on the distinction, see Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 
616 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1980). 
6 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 
336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964); Int’l Mfg.Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1964) (“No 
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should be able to pool them and insist on licensing them together.  The Line Material case 
involved such a situation.  The Supreme Court condemned the pool, but not because the 
members pooled.  Rather, they additionally agreed to stipulate the price at which the licensed 
product could be sold.7 
 "Blocking" patents are necessarily complements with respect to blocking claims, but in 
other ways they may function as substitutes.  A good, litigated example is the Philips decision, 
which involved a pool of technologies for rewritable compact discs.8 (Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 
2011; Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2012) One of the patents at issue employed an analog method 
for locating the stylus on the disc, while another patent employed a digital method.  A 
manufacturer would use one of these technologies or the other, but not both.  However, the 
analog method wrote on at least one claim in the digital patent, meaning that one could not 
practice the analog patent without licensing the digital patent.  That is, the patents functioned as 
both substitutes and as one-way complements with respect to the blocking claim. 
 As the Philips case suggests, blocking patents can create a special case of patent 
complementarity.  Two patented inventions may appear to be substitutes for most purposes, but a 
single conflicting claim can turn the patents into complements, at least for devices that practice 
that particular claim.  Courts have observed that a large information technologies pool might 
contain hundreds of potentially blocking relationships that are unlikely to be identified without 
costly and time-consuming litigation.9 
Tying and "Unwanted" Tied Products 
 The patents in a pool are typically offered to outside licensees as a  bundle.  They are 
either not licensed separately or else separate licensing costs more per patent.  The antitrust tying 
problem arises when a licensee claims that it can obtain the desired patents (the "tying" product) 
only by taking the remainder of the bundle (the "tied" product).   Tying complaints are most 
likely when licenses from patentees into the pool are exclusive, meaning that outsiders cannot 
obtain a license except through the pool.  If the licenses are nonexclusive then licensees might be 
able to avoid the pool altogether. 
 The antitrust law of tying requires a tie of "separate products," market power in the tying 
product, and some kind of harmful effect on competition (Hovenkamp, 2015b). An unlawful 
                                                          
commercially feasible device could be manufactured under one of the patents without infringing the 
other”).  
7United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
8U.S. Philips corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
9 Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., 2010 WL 4366448 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2010). 
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antitrust tie can also be found when a seller gives a lower price to someone who takes two 
products together than for those who make separate purchases.10 
 The general rule for establishing competitive harm from tying is that the tie must 
foreclose, or exclude, competition, typically in the tied product market.  Most antitrust 
challenges to patent pool ties allege that the licensee really wants a smaller set of patents than the 
pool offers.  He does not want the tied patents at all, from any seller.11   But the purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to promote competition, not merely to regulate the size of packages, and thus 
these challenges typically fail.  For example, it is not unlawful for a land owner to insist on 
selling her 100 acre farm as a single parcel rather than cutting out a single acre at a particular 
buyer's insistence. 
 The unwanted tied product rationale, however, also suggests that the patents in the pool 
are not all complements, at least not for this particular purchaser.  If the patents were substitutes 
the licensee would want only one of them, and the others would clearly be "unwanted."  If the 
patents were complements for that particular licensee, however, the licensee would want both. 
 An important qualifier is that although the licensee may want both of them he may not 
want both from the same seller.  A bundle can sometimes violate the antitrust laws if the licensee 
wants complementary technology, but from a different seller.  Suppose that a pool includes 
patents A and B, which are complements.  However, an outside patentee has also created 
patented technology B', which performs the same function as B.  In this case the pool can 
exclude B' by forcing the purchaser to take A and B together.  To be sure, he might be able to 
license B' separately, but his incentive is lessened to the extent that the pool license already 
covers B.  It effectively forces the licensor of B' to compete with a price of zero.12  In this case 
even the pooling of complementary patents can cause competitive harm. 
Limitations on the Complement/Substitute Distinction 
 The substitute/complement distinction has a robust history and is a helpful way of 
thinking about competitive problems in traditional patent pools. In many of the pools commonly 
seen today, however, the distinction is less important.  Intermediate cases between perfect 
complements and perfect substitutes are far more numerous and also more complex.  For 
example, patents may block one another in some uses but not others and even patents that are 
predominantly substitutes can have blocking claims, requiring that they be used together. 
(Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2012). 
                                                          
10Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. petition filed  (granting 
preliminary injunction). 
11 E.g., Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., 2010 WL 4366448 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2010). 
12Grid Sys. Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (sustaining antitrust 
complaint on this theory). 
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 The subject/complement relationship may depend not merely on the patents but also on 
the nature of the licensees' products.  For example, the MPEG-LA pool licenses thousands of 
digital video patents to a wide variety of manufacturers of cell phones (both traditional and smart 
phones), cameras, televisions, computer displays, digital storage devices, video and other image 
editing and processing software, and so on.  Some of these products both generate and display 
video content.  Some do only one and a few do neither.  Not all licensees from MPEG-LA use 
every patent or perhaps even more than a small number.  Some may incorporate both of two 
particular patents; others may incorporate one but not the other.  As a result, for one 
manufacturer two patents may operate as complements while for another they are either 
substitutes or unrelated. 
 Further, the products themselves may function as either complements or substitutes.  For 
example, an operating system and a web browser are complementary in the sense that each 
performs some computer functions that the other cannot, and consumers often want both.  On the 
other hand, consumers are increasingly able to perform tasks and run applications over the web, 
and this common ground makes them substitutable in some important respects.  For example, a 
smartphone both takes and displays video, making it both a complement and a substitute for a 
large digital display. 
Reducing Costs of Boundary Delineation and Defense 
 A more robust explanation for pooling in many markets comes out of the economics of 
transaction costs, which emphasizes the role of limited information and the costs of obtaining it, 
as well as uncertainty in bargaining and sharing. (Williamson, 1975; Hovenkamp, 2010; see also 
Orr, 2013)  Pooling is an efficient solution to problems of technology development and transfer 
when determining patents' validity or identifying their boundaries is costly.  
 While manufacturers typically know their own products well, they are often uncertain 
about how many patents their products write on and, if so, how many of those patents are valid.  
For example, very extensive litigation in the market for cellular phones and related hand held 
electronic devices reveals a great deal of ambiguity about scope, narrow claim constructions, and 
high invalidity rates.  By one estimate 90% of the claims in this market fail. (Muller, 2014).  By 
another estimate the number of patents relevant to smartphone technology exceeds 250,000.13 
 In such cases the cost of identifying and defending boundaries can be higher than the cost 
of simply sharing access.  Traditional resource pools often involve similar problems.  These 
include fisheries, irrigation, grazing rights, and other low technology alternatives that have been 
subject to private, shared production for centuries (Ostrom, 1990).  What these markets share in 
                                                          
13 See https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20121017/10480520734/there-are-250000-
active-patents-that-impact-smartphones-representing-one-six-active-patents-today.shtml. 
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common is that the cost of sharing plus enforcing access and contribution rules is less than the 
cost of creating, identifying and enforcing individual boundaries. 
 For example common fisheries are created when many fishermen have the right to fish in 
certain waters, but the stock needs to be replenished and overfishing prevented.  A traditional 
private property regime would address these problems by giving each fisherman an exclusive 
patch of water protected by a defensible boundary.  If the fisherman fails to restock, his own 
yield suffers, as it will if he overfishes.  The advantage of private property rights is that they 
create proper incentives by internalizing both the costs and payoffs of exploiting a resource. 
 In this case, however, the costs of dividing the pool into many individual parcels would 
be catastrophically high.  First the group would have to decide on boundaries, then they would 
have to build fences and maintain them against both human and ichthyan violators, perhaps with 
devastating consequences for the yield.  A better approach is to give each rights-holding 
fisherman managed access to the entire pool, with defined catch limits and an obligation to 
contribute to maintenance. (Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2012, pp. 325-364)  This is simply a 
special case of Ronald Coase's Nature of the Firm, which showed that a business firm maximizes 
profits by choosing as between more and less profitable ways of accomplishing something.  
(Coase, 1937)  In this case the payoff to sharing is greater than the payoff to individual rights of 
exclusion.  As Elinor Ostrom observed in her studies of common pool resources, the use of such 
commons is product (technology) specific.  For example, in some regions farmers maintain 
individual parcels for their crops while using a commons for grazing. (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 61-65) 
 The patent pool gives members instant and indemnified access to all patents in the pool.  
The pool owners need not worry about which patents the licensee may be practicing, and the 
licensee need not worry about whether or not it is infringing any particular patent in the pool, 
because its pool license grants it access to all.  Of course the solution is incomplete to the extent 
that a user might infringe one or more patents that have not been licensed to the pool. 
 Gilbert (2004) recommends that antitrust authorities concentrate their enforcement 
activities against pools on weak patents.  For many traditional pools that is sound advice.  In 
information technologies pools with thousands of patents, however, it is probably not worth the 
enforcer's time to investigate every patent in a pool, except perhaps for identifying those that are 
clearly invalid on their face. Indeed, one might simply assume that several of these patents are 
quite weak and that many have indeterminate boundaries.  The problem is that ex ante we don’t 
know which ones, and the costs of claim construction and invalidity assessments can run to 
thousands of dollars per patent. One party in such litigation involving three patents spent 
$600,000 just through claim construction.14 
Limited Importance of Delineating a Pool’s Inner Boundaries 
                                                          
14Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp., 653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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 An individual patent’s boundaries distinguish its protected embodiments from 
noninfringing technology.  But when multiple patents are aggregated what matters are the outer 
boundaries that separate the portfolio as a whole from outside patents or the public domain.  So 
long as the relevant rights are somewhere in the portfolio, the parties do not need to delineate the 
boundaries of individual patents in order to strike a deal.   
 For example, if a landowner wants to sell his neighbor a license to walk through his 
meadow, the contract need not specify the exact boundaries of the path; it is much simpler to  
include the entire meadow, even though this is more than the neighbor requires.  This likely 
benefits the neighbor, as he need not worry about mistakenly traveling slightly outside a 
narrowly-defined path, and it probably makes little difference to the landowner.  Of course, if the 
parties were negotiating the sale of an exclusive strip of land for development, then they would 
want to specify precise boundaries. 
 Similarly, when a pool of patents is licensed, it is not necessary to trace out the exact set 
of pooled patents on which a licensee’s product will read.  For example, suppose a patent pool 
includes related patents X and Y, whose boundaries are difficult to distinguish (perhaps because 
they arguably overlap).  A licensee wants to secure the rights to produce something that 
definitely reads on patent X, and may or may not also read on patent Y.  But the value of the 
licensing application does not hinge on this question  The parties might as well agree on a license 
for both X and Y, because there is no reason why the terms of trade would be any different if 
they hired a lawyer to discern the inner boundary between X and Y. 
 Of course, the portfolio would be worth less if a large number of its patents or its most 
desired ones were invalid or easily invented around.  But these possibilities could just be priced 
into the license fee, and this would allow the parties to forgo the costs of boundary identification 
without affecting the expected terms of trade.  Even if delineating a pool’s inner boundaries were 
not prohibitively costly, it is not clear that the parties would derive a significant benefit from 
doing so.  The value of the license to a product producer relates to the market value of its product 
in relation to costs: the product is not more valuable as it embodies more patents.  The case law 
has often neglected this insight.  Value is determined by the technology's contribution to the 
value of the licensee's product or process as well as the cost of substitutes, regardless of how 
individual IP rights are divided up. 
 Nevertheless, a pool’s inner boundaries are still important in determining how the pool's 
proceeds will be allocated among contributing members; a party who contributes more patents or 
whose patents are practiced more often may expect to get paid more.  But this problem need not 
affect the fees charged by the pool.  Indeed, a pool’s objective is typically to choose the license 
fees that maximize aggregate licensing revenues, regardless of how those revenues are 
subsequently divided among members.  This is best for each member, no matter its percentage-
stake in the pool’s revenues. 
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Pricing in Patent Pools vs. Conventional Bundling 
 A conventional bundle involves the sale of two or more physical components, such as a 
camera and film, both of which are rivalrous goods.  By contrast, in a nonexclusive license to a 
patent pool the licensor retains the undiminished right to use or license the right.  Indeed, even 
transaction costs need not be any higher when a patentee licenses a group of patents than when it 
licenses only one.   These things are invariably true if the licensee does not practice these 
patents.  Even if it does, however, practicing imposes costs on the licensor only if it adversely 
affects the licensor (as in the case of licensing a patent to a competitor) or if such use reduces 
other parties’ willingness to pay for a license.  In sum, if the licensee does not use all patents in 
the bundle, then the inclusion of the unused licenses has no impact on either party.  
Consequently, the price of the bundle will reflect the fact that many of the included licenses 
neither benefit the licensee nor impose costs on the licensor, and this suggests that a 
representative licensee is not necessarily being forced to pay extra for something it does not 
want.   
 The bundle of licenses in a patent pool resembles a restaurant buffet.  Buffets are 
common even though ownership is clear, as are the “boundaries” between individual items.  The 
entry fee gives the customer a nonexclusive right to select food options in any combination he 
wants, but the buffet serves other diners simultaneously.  Each consumer takes a subset of the 
available options, and the price will reflect the average cost of such subsets – not the cost of 
providing every food option to every consumer.  Of course, if the buffet adds a new food option, 
this will affect some consumers’ choices; some will take the new option and a little less of 
something else, but this will not necessarily make consumers’ choices more costly on average.  
A representative consumer is not being made to pay extra for anything he does not want, so a 
customer who chooses only beef does not have a "tying" claim against the restaurant for forcing 
it to pay for numerous unwanted products.  Indeed, to the extent beef is more costly than other 
options, such a customer may actually impose higher costs on the restaurant.  The more accurate 
characterization of buffets is that, on average, consumers pay only for what they like but also 
receive options for everything else.  In the context of patent pooling, this suggests that prices do 
not reflect the value of all pooled patents, but rather the value of a representative application, 
most of which rely on only a subset of the patents. 
Pooling and Collusion Threats 
 While most patent pools are socially beneficial overall, certain practices or structures can 
pose competitive problems.  The biggest antitrust risk from pooling is collusion, and the threat of 
collusion depends on two things.  First is the market structure and the power of the pool within 
its market.  Second is the nature of pricing and exclusivity arrangements within the pool. 
(Merges, 1996) 
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 On the first issue, cartels profit only if they have market power.  Patent pools often cover 
an entire industry, but they can also be limited to a small number of firms in a larger market that 
have decided to share a unique technology.  Whether that technology confers sufficient 
advantage to enable them to raise their prices above cost is an empirical question.  Naked price 
fixing is generally said to be unlawful per se. The courts have been hesitant to apply the per se 
rule to agreements within a pool, however.  Softer forms of price-affecting conduct, as well as 
conduct that is directly implicated in joint production, is generally treated under antitrust's rule of 
reason.  This means that the pool's market power must be estimated. 
 The antitrust issue is also complicated by the presence of the Patent Act, whose specific 
provisions generally control the much more general provisions of the antitrust laws.  For 
example, the Patent Act authorizes patentees to grant licenses, including exclusive licenses.15  It 
also states that a patentee's unilateral refusal to license cannot be unlawful, although it does not 
say the same thing about concerted refusals.16  One can presume that the mere authorization to 
engage in a practice does not imply an authorization to do so anticompetitively -- at least, that is 
how the Supreme Court has interpreted statutory authorizations in other contexts.17  For example, 
while Section 271 authorizes a "patent owner" to refuse to license its patent, it says nothing 
about agreements among numerous patent owners to refuse to license outside the pool, nor does 
it extend that right to nonexclusive licensees. 
 Specific sharing agreements among pool members come in numerous varieties.  They 
may simply agree to share technology without any royalty.  Alternatively, one or any subset of 
pool members may charge other members a royalty -- something that is likely to occur if the 
participants have patent portfolios with different values, or if some members have no patents and 
thus participate only as licensees.  The royalty rate might be flat, annualized, or most commonly, 
an amount based on the number of units that a licensee produces or its revenue.  In addition, 
members may agree to limit the number of units embodying pooled patents that any member 
may produce. 
Express Collusion 
 Since market exchange cannot generally take place without an agreement on price, there 
is nothing inherently suspicious about a pool's agreements concerning how royalties on pooled 
patents are computed.  Nothing is inherently suspicious about agreements in which members 
who have contributed smaller portfolios pay more than those with larger portfolios, or licensees 
with no portfolios at all pay more than contributing licensors.  These are all essential 
                                                          
1535 U.S.C. § 261. 
1635 U.S.C. § 271 (d)(4). 
17E.g., FTC v. Phoebe-Putney, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013) (state statute authorizing one hospital to acquire 
another did not authorize merger that violated antitrust laws). 
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characteristics of bargaining behavior.  Further, Section 261 of the Patent Act places no limits on 
how royalties are computed. 
 What the Patent Act does not justify, however, is price fixing of the products that pool 
members sell.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court case law in this area is troublesome.  In its 1902 
Bement decision the court permitted pool members to fix the price of agricultural harrows 
produced with shared technology.18  The Court adhered to a version of that rule in the much 
criticized General Electric decision, upholding an agreement in which patentee GE licensed 
Westinghouse to produce incandescent bulbs under its patents but specified Westinghouse's 
selling price.19  By contrast, in Line Materials the Court condemned product price fixing 
contained in a cross-licensing agreement involving complementary patents.  More recently, dicta 
in the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Actavis expressly embraced Line Materials and 
expressly limited GE to a license price fix between a single licensee and single licensor.20 
 Express output limitations function much like price fixing agreements.  Indeed, cartels 
often operate more successfully by limiting output and letting the price rise to the new market 
level, rather than by fixing the price directly. (Stigler, 1962)  Nevertheless, inherent in the 
concept of a license is specification of a certain amount, such as the right to make 1000 units per 
year.  In any event, it is important to remember that output limitations refer to the number of 
times a patent can be practiced, not to the number of times a good can be sold.  For example, if a 
patentee licenses a manufacturer to make 1000 toasters weekly with the patentee's toast-detection 
sensor, the manufacturer is still free to make as many toasters as it pleases that do not practice 
that patent.  An attempt to limit those would be a per se unlawful output restriction. 
 The policy concerns respecting pool output agreements differ from those that govern 
more traditional common pool resources.  The traditional resource placed in a common pool is 
rivalrous, or subtractive, meaning that each person's use diminishes what is left for others.  For 
example, catch limits on a fishery commons are not inherently suspicious even though it 
resembles a cartel.  The catch limit is necessary in order to prevent overfishing.  Patents are non-
rivalrous, however.21  (See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2012, 328–329)  Absent a license 
restriction, if one of the two toaster makers in our previous illustration should increase its output 
by 50% that will not reduce the number of units that the competing manufacturer can make.  Of 
course, it may produce a "congestion externality" to the extent that the remaining market for 
toasters is smaller.  But that is nothing more than competition at work, and in fact social welfare 
is higher when patented inventions are more widely used.  As a result, output limitations in 
                                                          
18 Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
19 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).  For severe criticism of the rule, see Judge 
Posner's opinion in Asahi Glass co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F.Suppp.2d 986 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
20 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225, 2231-2232 (2013), discussing United States v. Line 
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
21 Justice Story made this error in Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story 525, 4 F. Cas. 261 (C.C. Mass. 1843). 
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patent pools should be regarded with greater suspicion than output limitations for traditional 
common pool resources. 
Pool Exclusivity 
 Patent pool "exclusivity" can take several forms.  First, it can refer to the contract that 
each licensor has with the pool, asking whether that licensor is free to license to others outside of 
the pool.  Second it can refer to the pool’s willingness as licensee to accept an offered technology 
from an outsider for inclusion in the pool.  Third it can refer to the pool's willingness as licensor 
to license to outsider manufacturers.  Fourth, it can refer to field-of-use or other restrictions 
given to licensees from the pool.  Nearly all of these arrangements are multilateral and thus are 
controlled by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  That does not mean, however, that they are 
unlawful. 
 No cartel can succeed unless it can reduce market-wide output.  For this reason cartels are 
fastidious about policing the output of cartel members.  For their part, the members have a strong 
incentive to cheat.  At the cartel price, revenues are considerable higher than marginal cost, 
making cheating very profitable (Hovenkamp, 2015b § 4.1a).  This is particularly true in IP 
markets, where marginal costs are low to begin with.  Each cheating sale produces considerable 
additional profit. 
 For these reasons, nonexclusivity in pool licensing arrangements suggests that the pool is 
procompetitive, (Hovenkamp, 2015b, § 5.5c; Dep’t of Justice & FTC, 2007; Greene, 2010) 
provided that nonexclusivity really means what it says.  That is, there might be small pools with 
public nonexclusivity but tacit exclusivity requirements.  Aside from that, however, a clear and 
public nonexclusivity requirement, particularly when the pool has a large number of members, 
significantly reduces the collusion risk.  
 Exclusive agreements between individual licensors and the pool are more difficult to 
analyze.  First, the pool may be willing to pay more for exclusive licenses to the extent that they 
commit technology suppliers to that particular pool's technology, giving the pool an advantage 
over alternative licensing outlets.  This may also enable the pool to develop its own distinct 
brand, with technology that cannot be readily copied by outsiders. 22   In this sense they operate a 
little more like exclusive dealing or output contracts, which are competitive most of the time but 
can raise competition concerns when market power and foreclosure rates are sufficiently high 
(Hovenkamp, 2011, ¶1821). 
 The second type of exclusivity concerns the outside developer of technology who wants 
to include its patents in the pool but is denied.  One clearly procompetitive explanation for the 
pool's refusal to accept an offeror's technology is that the excluded technology is inferior to or no 
better than technology that the pool already has.  There are good reasons for a pool not to accept 
                                                          
22E.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
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an inferior substitute technology; namely, it will not make the pool products better and it might 
raise fears of collusion.  If the prospective licensor's technology is simply unwanted by pool 
members, that also indicates lack of competitive harm.  The firms in the pool have a right to 
make their own technology choices, even when they do so by agreement.  Indeed, even a 
dominant network should not have an obligation to accept a set of licenses to a technology that 
its members do not want, and no concern about competition arises. 
 Competitive harm can occur when some pool members already have technology in the 
pool that competes with the excluded firm's superior technology.  In that case the pool can 
operate as an anticompetitive boycott.23   Assessing the merits of such claims is difficult, because 
it may require the fact finder to assess the merits of the excluded technology.  As a result it is 
essential to make sure that structural prerequisites are present.  For example, an essential element 
in such a claim would be the existence of an influential pool member or members who own 
competing technology and have sufficient power to foist an inferior technology on others, 
perhaps by manipulating the process.24 
 The third type of exclusivity is the pool that licenses to others only selectively, perhaps 
only to member-licensors or perhaps to some others.  Once again rule of reason treatment is 
generally appropriate.  No general antitrust rule requires a joint venture to share its technology 
with rivals, particularly in small or specialized ventures whose formation required significant 
investment.  The main reason is to limit free riding on the members’ costly efforts.  For example, 
three firms may agree with each other to cross-license their patents and develop a new product.  
A fourth stands aside, wishing not to assume the risk of failure.  Then, after the venture succeeds, 
the fourth firms wants to join.  An antitrust rule that permitted late joiners would operate as a 
disincentive to invest in the first place. 
 Larger, mostly-open pools present a different issue.   If the pool controls a network, 
access to the pool may be essential for operation on the network.  Selective exclusion may be a 
way of disciplining price cutting by refusing pool access.  As a result, a practice that selectively 
denies pool access to price cutters or other aggressive firms could be unlawful. (Hovenkamp, 
2012, ¶¶2220-2224).  Relatedly, as with exclusivity agreements limiting licensor-membership, a 
concerted refusal to license to a firm may be unlawful if it amounts to a group boycott that serves 
to restrain competition in a downstream product market. 
 The fourth type of exclusivity really concerns market divisions in the pool, and several of 
these have been prosecuted under the antitrust laws.  These are most likely to be a threat when 
individual pool members dominate different market segments.  The pool management might then 
                                                          
23 E.g., Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 270–71 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting such 
a claim); see also TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 3584626, at *25 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2012) (sustaining a complaint); Cryptography Research Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 
No. C 04-04143 JW, 2008 WL 5560873, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (similar). 
24 Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
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use field-of-use restrictions on member-licensees to divide the market, thus preventing each 
member from entering competition with a different member.  For example, Hartford-Empire 
condemned such an arrangement among firms whose pool divided the market for different types 
of glass bottles.25 
 Sometimes these various types of exclusivity can operate together and heighten antitrust 
concerns.  For example, the pool's refusal to license a newcomer is potentially more harmful if 
the original licensor members of the pool also have exclusive license agreements.  If these 
agreements are nonexclusive, then the manufacturer who is denied a pool license can still try to 
obtain essential patents from individual licensor members.26 
A Brief Note on FRAND 
 Standard setting organizations often identify standards essential patents (SEPs) that cover 
an adopted and shared technology.  In order to acquire SEP status participating patent owners 
must generally promise to license their patents to willing participants on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms (Hovenkamp, 2015a; Lemley, 2002, Swanson & Baumol, 
2005).  As a result, these pools are generally nonexclusive in the sense that anyone can become a 
licensee simply by agreeing to pay the FRAND royalty.  The principal litigation has involved 
royalty computation27 and entitlement to an injunction.28 
Concluding Note: Pooling and Innovation Rates 
 A large but quite inconclusive literature discusses the relationship between pooling and 
innovation.  Conclusions are extremely sensitive to assumptions about patent strength and 
quality, about the relationship among the patents in a pool and the strength of alternatives outside 
the pool, about the impact on innovation of insiders vs. outsiders to the pool, and finally, about 
the strategic responses of participants.  In addition are difficulties in assessing innovation rates.  
Counting patents issued per time period is relatively easy, but is not a good measure of 
innovation if patents are of low quality or if firms respond to the pool by altering their patenting 
behavior rather than their innovation behavior. 
 The existence of a pool may distort innovation behavior.  For example, a firm might 
decide to protect a particular innovation with a trade secret rather than a patent in order to avoid 
committing it to a pool.  Alternatively, it may rely on simple first mover advantages in order to 
avoid patent disclosure requirements.  Another distortion results from how royalties are divided 
                                                          
25Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 392-400 (1945). 
26 E.g., United States v. Associated Patents, 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (condemning agreement 
among manufacturers giving each exclusive rights to build particular types of machines and noting that 
pool members refused to license their patents outside the pool). 
27E.g., Ericcson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 2013 WL 2111217 W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
28 Apple, Inc. v Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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up.  For example, if the pool divides royalties by the number of patents, then pool members have 
an incentive to make patents thinner in order to increase their number. (Baron and Delcamp, 
2015) Finally, one must distinguish anticipatory innovation which occurs when a patent pool is 
announced (Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Dequiedt & Versaevel, 2013), from equilibrium innovation 
which occurs on an ongoing basis after the pool is in operation (Baron & Pohlmann, 2015). 
 A well-functioning patent pool should reduce the costs of sharing technology, which it 
can do by making it easier for manufacturers to assemble complements, eliminate double 
marginalization, or reduce the costs of defining or defending patent boundaries.  Since all of 
these costs operate as a deadweight loss on innovation one would think that the impact of a well 
designed pool is positive.  On the other side, pooling may reduce the appropriation value of 
innovations, particularly if pool members must commit in advance to dedicate new patents to the 
pool.  In that case, rather than obtaining the entire return the pool member must contemplate 
sharing with others, and this may create common pool management problems.  Each firm will 
have a tendency to shirk, profiting instead from the inventions of others. 
 The theoretical and empirical literature points in both directions, with most literature 
finding that most patent pools increase innovation rates (e.g., Baron & Pohlmann, 2015; see also 
Shapiro, 2001; Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Mossoff, 2011), although there is also literature 
concluding to the contrary (e.g., Lampe & Moser, 2010, 2013, 2016). Others find that pools of 
stronger patents tend to increase innovation while pools dominated by weaker patents more 
likely to be invalidated in litigation do not (Choi & Gerlach, 2013). 
 As a general proposition a pool should increase the demand for innovation of 
complements to the pool.  First of all, access to the existing technology by pool members should 
be guaranteed and cheaper.  To the extent the pool reduces licensing costs and eliminates royalty 
stacking the cost of further improvements should decline.  When innovation is cumulative the 
development of new technology may require the licensing of existing technology with multiple 
patent holders.  Pooling can reduce these costs and thus facilitate cumulative innovation. 
(Scotchmer, 1991). 
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